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OPENING REMARKS  - WELCOME
BERTRAND LOUVEL*
Professors, lawyers, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen:
“A formidable Siren” wrote Professor Dejean de la Bâtie: the notion 
of causation in law “willingly misleads those seduced by its subtlety.” If a 
consensus exists on this proposition, it is undoubtedly on the difficulty of 
addressing this “always irritating” question, apparently “unsolvable” for 
some, “a formidable mystery” that is among “the most illusive in our law.”
From the Latin cavere, cause calls one to “be on your guard,” to “de-
fend oneself.” It plays with the ambiguity inherited from the Greek aitia
which, in the same word, evokes the enigma of fault and of the origin of 
things such as the reason for being or the motivation of an act. Should we 
then be surprised to see Georges Ripert describe all effort to theorize on the 
subject “absolutely futile research”?
Faced with such a challenge, the temptation of an “evacuation of the 
causal link” is strong, through the use of presumptions and the introduction 
of new concepts such as “implication” or “imputation.” The need to estab-
lish a relation of cause and effect between an act or product and damage 
has been increasingly called into question.
Respected scholars have called for the courts to abstain from all causal 
analysis. Some have desired to confound the notion of causality with that of 
damage, or to renounce or to replace it by a bar to the proceedings justified 
by the remoteness between the harm and the original cause. Equity and risk 
are proposed as alternatives, when one claims to apply in this domain the 
Aquilian theory of relativity.1
Nonetheless, the idea of causality remains omnipresent. Perhaps be-
cause it appears to be a requirement of reason or an imperative of justice, it 
remains entrenched as a general condition of liability. It must be said that 
the role of this “constant” in liability law has increased with the develop-
* Premier Président of the Court of Cassation, France. Translation by Andrea Richard, Estour-
nal.
1. It corresponds to the fact that “an action alleging liability for fault is allowed only to the 
extent that the alleged damage is of the nature that the law intends to prevent by making the defendant’s 
conduct unlawful.” RAYMOND LEGEAIS, GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS. APPROCHE 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
02 LOUVEL SPEECH FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:16 PM
458 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
ment of “objective” [strict] liabilities. Thus, the need to grasp a notion of 
causality that marks the limits of the obligation of reparation appears more 
crucial than ever.
Of course, a number of authors continue to promote a pragmatic ap-
proach, evoking a “question of common sense more than science.” In his 
assessment, Esmein places causality in the realm of “feeling.”
Case law would work itself out in the same empirical manner, focus-
ing, in the words of Carbonnier, on “a moral rather than material causality.”
Certainly the Court of Cassation, like many of its foreign counterparts, 
exercises in this matter extensive control, verifying motivations as well as 
the soundness of conclusions drawn by trial judges based on evidence. 
Conscious of the difficulty of the exercise, it will not allow itself to be 
locked into any one system.
Proponents of the equivalence of conditions and adequate causation 
theories may oppose each other all they like, they will not manage to con-
vince all sides. Some have tried, without much success, to reconcile their 
contributions, invoking one to decide the merits and the other to arbitrate 
the delicate question of proof. Opinions also differ concerning the role to 
be accorded to a causality which, in the litigation of civil liability, appears 
to be “one tool of adjustment among many.”
Faced with the difficulties of an often debated scientific reality, the 
courts have, over time, gradually resolved to consider that such a causal 
link may be established across the remaining uncertainty regarding its ex-
istence. The courts accept to compensate the loss of chance and are led to 
be satisfied with probabilities.
It must be said that the art of judging is, in essence, that of dealing 
with uncertain, undetermined and doubtful situations, of which there is 
only an altered image that the parties portray. Decision-making proceeds, 
in a certain manner, through a weighing of probabilities when, from the 
clues provided by each party and behavioral norms, the magistrate is forg-
ing an idea of the possible chain of events under the circumstances.
According to the writings of eminent jurists and philosophers in the 
past, causation could mean a power of production linking one object to 
another which would be its result. David Hume, on the other hand, suggest-
ed a simple “law” of succession founded on repeated occurrences, which 
has to be built rather than observed.
Evoking probabilities, as we have just done, follows the same path.
What counts in liability law, where reparation is conditioned by the 
existence of a causal link between the original event and the damage, is, 
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appearance of the second (the damage) from the observation of the first 
(the original event). A “causal explanation,” inspired by Karl R. Popper’s 
work in the philosophy of science, is based on a general law which permits 
explanation of a particular event based on the identified circumstances.
Admittedly, jurists and scientists do not use the same criteria or the 
same requirements to judge the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of 
such an explanation. But are their approaches so radically different?
After all, their objectives differ, and the judge, contrary to the re-
searcher, cannot remain uncertain. There is no room for denial of justice in 
the matter. It is his task, according to a formula dear to the economic analy-
sis of law, to select the “efficient” causes of the damage, those which ex-
plain it best.
Another important question is the evaluation, once damage has been 
determined, of the burden to be borne by each party in repairing it.
The distinction between being liable and determining the amount 
eventually to be paid by the defendants is familiar to lawyers, but nonethe-
less challenging.
In this domain as well, we cannot agree with the observation that the 
theories of equivalence of conditions and adequate causation offer help as
keys to the apportionment of the burden of reparation. It is undoubtedly fair 
to assert here that a distinction must be made between an event’s causal 
nature with respect to the realization of the damage and the extent of its 
contribution to the damage.
Confronted with this delicate question of apportionment, judges too 
often find themselves forced to make a certain approximation—sometimes 
under the cover of frequently contested indicative scales—when assessing 
the share to be borne by each party.
It is of interest whether economic science, and the quantification tools 
at its disposal, can here also offer interesting perspectives.
The “Damage” project supported by the National Research Agency 
carries this ambition. It is the result of a partnership of excellence, uniting 
BETA and the François Gény Institute of the University of Lorraine with
the Center for Economic and Legal Research at the University of Panthéon-
Assas (Paris).
The Court of Cassation is pleased to contribute to the success of such 
an undertaking by sharing its database of the rulings of the Courts of Ap-
peal, “Jurica.” We are also sensitive to the trust of each of the institutions 
involved in the project in choosing to meet mid-way through the project in 
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We are glad to see such distinguished personalities with such diverse 
backgrounds respond to our invitation.
Please allow me to welcome each of them, as well as to thank the wise 
craftsmen of these meetings, Monsieur the professor Samuel Ferey and 
Madame the professor Florence G’sell.
Welcome, Mesdames and Messieurs, to this Grand Chambre.
All my best wishes for every success in your work.
